

## Lecture 18

### An Outline of Song and Ming Confucianism

I have written a volume explaining the philosophy of the Wei [CE 220-265] and Jin [CE 265-420] dynasties; then two volumes [*Buddha-Nature and Prajna*] to discuss Buddhism in the Northern [CE 386-589] and Southern [CE 420-589] dynasties [CE 420-589], the Sui [589-618] dynasty, and the Tang [618-907] dynasty; then four volumes to discuss the *lixuejia* [School of Reason-Principle Learning, Rationalists, Confucianists] of the Song [960-1280] and Ming [1368-1644] dynasties. The first of these to be completed was the book on Wei and Jin *xuan* metaphysics entitled *Material-Nature and Xuan Metaphysical Principles* [*Caixing yu Xuanli*]. Then I wrote about the philosophy of the Song and Ming periods. This took about ten years. I was at the time at the Chinese University of Hong Kong, with little to do and plenty of time on my hands. So I was able to collect my thoughts, concentrate my mind, shut the door, and think carefully about the learning of the past. As a result I was able to finish the three-volume work, *Moral Mind and Moral Nature* [*Xinti yu Xingt*, also *Mind-Substance and Nature-Substance*] in one breath. The three volumes cover roughly the scope and intellectual development of Song and Ming *lixuejia*. There remained a last volume which I just recently finished, which is the book *From Lu Xiangshan to Liu Jishan* [*Cong Lu Xiangshan dao Liu Jishan*].

That three-volume work on Song-Ming *lixuejia* deals with Zhou Lianxi [Zhou Dunyi, 1017-1073], Zhang Hengqu [Zhang Zai, 1020-1077], Cheng Mingdao [Cheng Hao, 1032-1085], and Cheng Yichuan [Cheng Yi, 1033-1108] of the Northern Song dynasty [960-1127] as well as Hu Wufeng [1106-1162] and Zhu Zi [Zhu Xi, 1130-1200] of the Southern Song dynasty [1127-1280], altogether six men. This was not a history of philosophy but a discussion of the *lixuejia* of the Song and Ming dynasties. Since a history of philosophy must discuss linkages and transitions, Shao Yaofu [Shao Yong, 1011-1077] should also get a chapter in a history of philosophy. But when we focus on a discussion of *lixuejia* we do not need to include Shao Yaofu, even though he had an important position at that time and was a friend of the two Cheng brothers, for their thought took different paths and Shao Yaofu's thought did not fall within this system.

Although in terms of time-span the Song-Ming *lixuejia* covered some 600 years of the Song and Ming dynasties, it in fact had only one topic with only nine men who were principally involved. Starting from Zhou Lianxi through Zhang Hengqu, Cheng Mingdao, and Cheng Yichuan, there were only four philosophers in the Northern Song period. Of course there were many men among the disciples of the two Cheng brothers, but they were subordinate, not principal, figures. After the dynasty moved south, the first to digest the four philosophers of the Northern Song was Hu Wufeng, the son of Hu Anguo. His school was called the Hu-Xiang school by his contemporaries because he lived in Hengshan [Mount Heng] in Hunan [Xiang]. This was a very important school at the time, when Zhu Zi was yet unknown. Later on the Hu-Xiang school was overpowered and overshadowed by Master Zhu [Zhu Zi], which explains why it is a rare scholar of this period who knows much about Hu Wufeng. Actually in the *Song-Yuan Xue'an* [*Studies of Song-Yuan Philosophers*] there are “Wufeng Xue'an” [Wufeng Studies] which include quite a few men, but everyone tended to overlook them. Hu Wufeng in fact was a very important figure, but because he was overshadowed by Master Zhu's authority, all the attention fell on Zhu. Whether Master Zhu deserves to overshadow him, however, remains debatable.

Hu Wufeng was the first to digest the philosophy of the four thinkers of the Northern Song dynasty. When Master Zhu emerged, he also continued this kind of assimilative work, although he never succeeded in fully understanding them. He could actually only assimilate one of them, Cheng Yichuan, but he used one Cheng, Cheng Yichuan, to encompass the two Cheng, gathering Cheng Mingdao's thought into that of Cheng Yichuan and resulting in one Cheng. Actually of the two philosophers Cheng, Cheng Mingdao was the primary one. Cheng Mingdao has an exalted and awesome position among the *lixuejia* philosophers, but Master Zhu's assimilative effort was unable to reveal Cheng Mingdao's position. Although Master Zhu used Cheng Yichuan to encompass the two Cheng, Cheng Yichuan in fact could not encompass his elder brother Cheng Mingdao because the philosophies of the two were different. Master Zhu was only capable of appreciating Cheng Yichuan, whom he understood very well. There was no distance between them, and very little difference. They found each other compatible and congenial. On the other hand, Master Zhu could not quite appreciate Cheng

Mingdao. He did not understand him yet felt he could not criticize him since his position was so high. Despite Cheng Mingdao's eminence, Master Zhu was unable to explain his philosophy in a way commensurate with this eminence, and so in Master Zhu's mind Cheng Mingdao remained a shadowy figure.

Master Zhu encompassed two Cheng with one Cheng and then, making the two Cheng the center of this thought, encompassed Zhou Lianxi and Zhang Hengqu, in this way assimilating the four philosophers. Hence, on the surface of it, everyone thought Master Zhu was the progenitor and orthodox school of Song Confucianism, the so-called *Daoxuejia* [philosophers of Dao Learning]. The *Song Shi* [*History of the Song Dynasty*] speaks of "the tradition of Dao Learning" which included five men, the so-called "Lian 濂, Lo 洛, Guan 關, Min 閩." That Lu Xiangshan [Lu Jiuyuan, 1139-1193] is not included in the list reflects the prejudice of the author of the *Song Shi*.<sup>1</sup> It meant that Lian, Lo, Guan, and Min represented the orthodox tradition of Song Confucianism. "Lian" referred to Zhou Lianxi; "Lo" referred to the two Cheng; "Guan" referred to Zhang Hengqu; and "Min" referred to Master Zhu. Therefore what he, Zhu, passed down would have been the orthodoxy. But in fact, of the four philosophers of Northern Song Master Zhu could only pass down the thought of Cheng Yichuan. Although he discussed Zhou Lianxi's *Tai Ji Tu Shuo* [*Explanation of the Diagram of the Great Ultimate*] at length, expending many words and an enormous effort on it, he did not understand it properly. Nor could he respond to the Dao-substance, [*Daoti*, transcendental Dao] grasped by Zhou Lianxi. This was because he used Cheng Yichuan's method in understanding Zhou. He had even less understanding of Zhang Hengqu. Zhang himself was of course somewhat of a medley, but his real thought should not be obscured. Although his language was not felicitous, its meaning was very clear. But it eluded Master Zhu. In Master Zhu's mind Zhang Hengqu was only a buttress to the two Cheng, someone unable to stand on his own. Occasionally he could discuss one or two elegant statements of Zhang's, but one or two statements cannot represent Zhang's thought, which Zhu certainly did not understand in its entirety.

Thus seen in this way the so-called lineage of "Lian, Lo, Guan, and Min" and the so-called "Master Zhu passed on the orthodox tradition of Song Confucianism" are in fact spurious. All Master Zhu did was pass on the school of Cheng Yichuan, and even

Cheng Yichuan did not represent his elder brother Cheng Mingdao. Even if we put Cheng Yichuan and Cheng Mingdao together they could not represent Zhang Hengqu and Zhou Lianxi. Master Zhu regarded Zhou Lianxi with great esteem and reverence, but he did not understand him enough; nor was he able to understand Zhang Hengqu and Cheng Mingdao. None of this is transparent to the layman, so you should work hard to understand it carefully. And the only basis for putting effort into it is their writings. You should try to gain a proper understanding of these writings. Master Zhu's effort on the writings was very deep, but whether his understanding was proper is quite another matter. Arriving at a proper understanding is by no means easy. We certainly acknowledge the places where he arrived at a proper understanding; for example, he had a very proper understanding of Cheng Yichuan. That was no problem. But we ought to recognize where his understanding was incorrect, and not get the two confused. This is what happened when Master Zhu inherited Song Confucianism.

When Hu Wufeng assimilated the four philosophers of the Northern Song dynasty, he made an idea of Zhang Hengqu's the center of his philosophy. This was the idea of *jinxin chengxing* [by fully realizing one's mind one will realize one's nature]. This idea was introduced by Zhang Hengqu but was given little importance by Master Zhu, which shows how difficult it is to understand an idea. The idea of *jinxin chengxing* involved the attitude towards “mind” [*xin*] and “[one's moral] nature” [*xing*], extending even to the attitude towards the “Dao-substance” [*Daoti*], and “moral effort and discipline” [*gongfu*]. In the phrase *jinxin chengxing*, “*jin*” and “*cheng*” refer to moral cultivation. Besides moral cultivation, this phrase also includes the concept of substance [*benti*]. What does substance refer to? It refers to “mind-substance [*xinti*, one's moral, transcendental mind]” and “nature-substance [*xingti*, one's moral, transcendental nature]” and from “nature-substance” penetrating to “Dao-substance” [*Daoti*]. All these important concepts are in this phrase. Thus in assimilating the four philosophers of Northern Song Confucianism, Hu Wufeng made this phrase of Zhang Hengqu's the center of his thought. His understanding of mind-substance, nature-substance, and Dao-substance broadly speaking is of a piece with the understanding of Zhou Lianxi and Zhang Hengqu. Therefore his absorption and encompassing of Zhou Lianxi and Zhang Hengqu by means of this phrase were acceptable and a relatively proper thing to do. Not electing to

transmit the philosophy of Cheng Yichuan, he instead transmitted another body of thought. This body of thought was in accord with the first three Northern Song philosophers, namely Zhou Lianxi, Zhang Hengqu, and Cheng Mingdao, and not with Cheng Yichuan. What Master Zhu assimilated, however, was in accord with Cheng Yichuan and not with the three earlier philosophers. That is why Master Zhu and Hu Wufeng found each other incompatible.

Hu Wufeng's writings were sparse but very fine. Among his writings is *Zhi Yan* [*Understanding Words*], which is a borrowing from *Mencius*, where Mencius says: "I understand words and I am good at cultivating my floodlike energy [我知言，我善養吾浩然之氣]." [*Mencius* 2A.2.11]. Master Zhu criticized *Understanding Words* sharply, expressing his doubts in eight points.<sup>2</sup> In fact, not a single point was correct. He did not understand Hu Wufeng because their systems were different, a question that we must make an effort to re-examine.

At first I too could not understand Hu Wufeng. I had no idea what he was talking about. No one understood him because no one discussed him. Everyone's attention was on such great masters as Zhou Lianxi, Zhang Hengqu, the two Cheng, and Master Zhu. Once I asked Mr. Tang Junyi [1909-1978] what Hu Wufeng was talking about. He thought a while, gave me a few sentences, but failed to enlighten me. Whereupon I gathered the materials on Hu Wufeng and sat down to examine them. It was then that I realized he had a system of thought and an important idea—"Jinxin chengxing [By fully realizing one's mind one will realize one's nature." Although this was an idea Master Zhu neglected, it was extremely important. The phrase "jin xin [fully realizing one's mind]" occurs in *Mencius*. Mencius said: "He who fully realizes his mind will know his nature. When he knows his nature, he will know Heaven. [盡其心者，知其性也；知其性，則知天也。]" (*Mencius*, 7A.1.1). The phrase "cheng xing 成性" [accomplish, realize one's nature] was first used by Zhang Hengqu. It was also discussed by Hu Wufeng, and sometimes by Liu Jishan [Liu Zongzhou, 1578-1645]. As a result, this idea became a framework for transmitting a philosophy which was different from that of Yichuan and Zhu Zi, as well as that of Wang Yangming. By means of this idea one can

digest the three Northern Song philosophies of Zhou Lianxi, Zhang Hengqu, and Cheng Mingdao.

That is why in *Moral Mind and Moral Nature* [*Xinti yu Xingtì*] I divided the *lixuejia* [School of Reason-Principle Learning, Confucians] of the Song and Ming into three strands: [Cheng] Yichuan and Zhu Zi as one strand, Lu and Wang as another strand, and Hu Wufeng and Liu Jishan as a third strand. This last strand was the successor to Zhou Lianxi, Zhang Hengqu, and Cheng Mingdao. Strictly speaking, the direct descendant of the Northern Song Confucians should be this strand and not Yichuan and Zhu Zi, nor Lu and Wang. Lu and Wang were the direct heirs of Mencius. Yichuan and Zhu Zi, on the other hand, succeeded the *Great Learning* [*Da Xue*] and had the *Great Learning* as their core. Special discussion of the *Great Learning* only started with Yichuan. According to the common understanding this meant the discussion of *gewu qiongli* [investigating things in order to fathom truth]. But this is according to the teaching of Zhu Zi and not Wang Yangming. It was when Yichuan explained moral cultivation that he began to explain the *Great Learning*. Master Zhu was the one who had the greatest interest in the *Great Learning*, which was why he expended so much energy on explaining *gewu qiongli*. If we look carefully at the writings of the three Northern Song philosophers, Zhou Lianxi, Zhang Hengqu and Cheng Mingdao, we will find that they did not take the *Great Learning* as their point of departure when they discussed moral effort and discipline [*gongfu*]. These three men seldom discussed the *Great Learning*. Cheng Mingdao occasionally mentioned the *Great Learning* when he discussed moral effort, while Cheng Yichuan only began to discuss the *Great Learning* later in his career. The two brothers were separated by only one year in age, but Cheng Mingdao died when he was only fifty years old, while Cheng Yichuan lived until his seventies. It was only after his elder brother died that Cheng Yichuan could teach independently, and thus only his later period represented his own thought. While his elder brother lived he could not express his own thought, but merely followed the philosophy of his brother. The important ideas and statements of Song Confucians on the pre-Qin [pre-255 BCE] classics such as the *Analects* [*Lun Yu*, Mencius[Meng Zi], the *Doctrine of the Mean* [*Zhong Yong*], and *Yijing* Commentaries [*Yi Zhuan*, *Yijing* “Appendices”], and so on, all began with Cheng Mingdao. He is therefore a giant with a

towering position. Zhu Zi, however, could not understand this great philosopher, but subsumed him under Cheng Yichuan, which is of course very problematic.

Was Yichuan's thought the same as his brother's? If they were identical, naturally he could represent both. But in fact they were not the same. Whether in explaining moral effort or in explaining substance, his understanding was different from that of his brother. To take a conspicuous example: In explaining *ren* [humaneness], Mingdao started from "The myriad things are one substance/body." [*Wanwu yiti*]<sup>3</sup> He also explained *ren* from "*jue* [feeling, awareness]." <sup>4</sup> The two ideas of *jue* and *ren* are related. But Cheng Yichuan simply disliked explaining *ren* through *jue*. Thus when later Master Zhu succeeded to Cheng Yichuan's philosophy he spared no pains in criticizing the concept of "explaining *ren* through *jue*." Then he went further and attacked the concept of using "The myriad things are one substance/body" to explain *ren*. In Zhu Zi's "Theory of *Ren*" [*Ren Shuo*] this was a very important question, and one which involved many other questions. So we can see that Cheng Yichuan and his brother were of two minds. Of course, speaking generally, they both taught the philosophy of Confucianism and were fairly alike. But if we were to take this perspective, then not only are the two Cheng fairly alike, all the nine men that I have just mentioned were all fairly alike, all belonging to one system. So we cannot look at it that way. There were differences.

It is peculiar that the three earlier Northern Song philosophers did not start with the *Great Learning* when they taught moral effort and discipline [*gongfu*]. People were baffled by this and it is particularly baffling to people of the present-day. Actually people of the present-day do not speak of moral cultivation at all. But in Song and Ming Confucianism, a discussion of ontological substance was invariably accompanied by a discussion of moral cultivation. They were discussed as if they were two sides of the same coin. Here is where Western philosophy falls short. Western philosophy is seen simply as philosophy. It stresses the analysis of theory but attaches no importance to the practical cultivation of virtue. *Gongfu* refers to "practice." Here is where Western philosophy does not talk about practice, whereas Eastern philosophy is quite different. Why do we talk about such things as moral mind [*xinti*, mind-substance], moral nature [*xingti*, nature-substance], and transcendental Dao [*Daoti*, Dao-substance]? All of it is theory! We talk about them because we have self-cultivation [*gongfu*], and it is within

effort and practice [*gongfu*] that we understand these truths. Thus a discussion of Dao includes practice. Discussion of *gongfu* is to attest Dao. These two sides correspond to each other. Not only is this true of Confucianism but it is also true of Daoism and Buddhism.

When Western philosophers speak of moral philosophy, they seldom speak of effort and discipline [*gongfu*]. For example, Kant's *Critique of Practical Reason* follows the pattern of *Critique of Pure Reason* in dividing its discussion into "Doctrine of Elements" and "Doctrine of Method." This is analogous to the discussion of elements and discussion of method in logic (the old logic was presented in this way.) Actually the "Doctrine of Method" in *Critique of Practical Reason* was simply *gongfu*. His discussion of practice [*gongfu*] was very brief but also very much to the point. Still, it is only the rudiments. It is brief and disproportionately dwarfed by the "Doctrine of Elements." It is the same with his *Critique of Pure Reason*. The first part is very long whereas the section on "Doctrine of Method" is very slight, but at least it is more than the "Doctrine of Method" in the *Critique of Practical Reason*. In the main, however, it is irrelevant and patchy.

When the first three philosophers of the Northern Song talked about *gongfu*, they did not start from the concept of *gewu zhizhi* [extending knowledge through investigating things] of the *Great Learning*. When it came to Yichuan and Zhu Zi, they began to promote the *Great Learning* and also to start from *gewu zhizhi*. Out of this Cheng Yichuan introduced two esoteric sayings: "Moral effort requires seriousness [*jing*]; advance in learning requires extending knowledge [*zhizhi*]. [涵養須用敬，進學則在致知]"<sup>5</sup> "Advance in learning requires extending knowledge" refers to *gewu qiongli* 格物窮理 [investigating things so as to fathom Reason/Principle/Universal Truth]. This aroused the greatest interest in Zhu Zi, and he adhered faithfully to it all his life. But this approach to moral practice (the moral effort required for becoming a sage) misses the mark, a point on which Zhu Zi was unenlightened. To approach moral practice in this way is what I describe as "conveniently acquired practice [*shunqu de gongfu*, 順取的功夫]." Why do I say that it misses the mark? Because this is to confuse knowledge with morals, to mix them together. This is unacceptable and Kant's intention was to separate

them. It is a great confusion to approach morals with the same approach that one approaches knowledge. It was something not done by the first three philosophers of the Northern Song or by their successors Hu Wufeng, Lu Xiangshan, Wang Yangming, and down to Liu Jishan. None of them talked about morals via the convenient road of *gewu zhizhi* [to extend knowledge by investigating things], of the *Great Learning*. The convenient path of acquiring practice is one that conveniently follows what is in front of our eyes, acquiring an exhaustive knowledge of the principles of things, and thereby determining the practice of morals, which is to say, to let knowledge determine morals. But the three earlier philosophers of the Northern Song simply did not teach the *Great Learning*, or made little mention of it. Do not think, however, that they did not teach moral practice, for they all taught moral practice. Lu Xiangshan, Wang Yangming, and Liu Jishan, however, discussed moral practice [*gongfu*] formally and faced this issue squarely. The moral practice these seven men taught was what was described as the “path of reflective realization” [*ni jue zhi lu* 逆覺之路].” “Reflective realization” [*ni jue*, self-awareness] is most essential in discussing moral practice. Grasping this point meant that they were able to regard morals as morals and not as knowledge. They did not teach morals as if they were discussing knowledge. In this way the two were naturally separated.

People these days regard the path that Zhu Zi took as unacceptable. But in the past everyone regarded him as the exemplar of the true teaching of the *lixuejia*, and as the true path to sageliness. Everyone believed he transmitted the Dao of the Sage, which was to teach us how to develop and erect our moral character. Hence his was the correct way. Why did men of the past regard him in this way? We should look at this question sympathetically. In the West, starting from Socrates through Aristotle, St. Thomas Aquinas down to the time before Kant, morals were generally discussed with the same attitude as one discussed knowledge. The ancients did not clearly establish a separation between morality and knowledge. It was the same in China. That is why Zhu Zi gained the position of representing the true doctrine. For this was “Learning below [in the sensible world] so as to reach above [to the transcendent world] [下學而上達].” But what Confucius meant by “Learning below so as to reach above ” was not necessarily the

model evinced by Zhu Zi. Men of the past tended to think in generalities and did not separate the two.

Looking at it sympathetically, we can analyze it this way: They were looking at it broadly from the perspective of education. The purpose of education was to teach people how to conduct themselves as humans and was concerned with man's concrete life. Looking at man's concrete life, which is to look at it broadly from the standpoint of education, Zhu Zi's method was the orthodox tradition. This "orthodox tradition" is from the standpoint of moral education. They were looking at man from his life as a whole, and not, as present-day man does, separating the knowledge aspect from the moral aspect. Taking this overall view, most people felt that Zhu Zi's method was relatively better and more balanced and solid. In this way he was able to win the position of the orthodox tradition. This is how we understand it sympathetically. But if Zhu Zi is to be seen as the orthodox tradition, then would not those thinkers who did not follow Yichuan and Zhu Zi's path be unorthodox? If we follow the views of the past, these thinkers did not belong to the orthodox tradition. That is why Zhu Zi did not like Cheng Mingdao, although he refrained from criticizing him. It is permissible to consider this question from the general viewpoint of moral education and from man's concrete life as a whole. For there is need for knowledge and morality in the concrete life. In fact there is need for religious faith, democratic government, and so forth, all of which have to be included.

But when men of the past discussed the Song and Ming *lixuejia*, they always venerated Confucius as the great founding preceptor of Confucianism. After Confucius a tradition was formed called the Confucian tradition. Confucius was not placed in the system of Yao, Shun, Yu, Tang, Wen, Wu, and Zhou Gong [ancient sage-rulers] to be the tail. If Confucius is placed in this system and we trace the line upwards, then it is called "venerating the Duke of Zhou [Zhou Gong] and Confucius together." Prior to the Tang and Song dynasties Zhou Gong and Confucius were always mentioned together. The appreciation of Confucius's unique value only began with the Song Confucians. Only then did men of the Confucian tradition appreciate his unique place in cultural development, and that he could not simply be a tail of a tradition that descended from Yao, Shun, Yu, Tang, Wen, Wu, and Zhou Gong. Herein lay the contribution of the Song Confucians. That is why beginning from the Song Confucians Zhou Gong and

Confucius were no longer bracketed together. Instead, Confucius and Mencius were mentioned together, which was quite different. This represented a step forward and a turning point.

With Confucius and Mencius being mentioned together, Confucius could begin a tradition himself and could occupy a unique place in Chinese culture. Beginning from the time of Confucius, politics and moral teaching bifurcated. If we take Yao, Shun, Yu, Tang, Wen, Wu and Zhou Gong as the center of the tradition, then politics was central and political success was central. Confucius, however, did not become emperor, nor did he become king. He had virtue but not position. So we can make the general statement that with Confucius politics and moral teaching became separate. Confucius's position was in "moral teaching," not in politics. Thus Confucius in his own person engendered a tradition. The Song Confucians grasped this point. In the ideal of "sage within, king without" [*nei sheng wai wang*] a position in moral teaching meant the "sage within." This was a point acknowledged by all the Song Confucians, including, one would think, Master Zhu. Here lay the contribution of Zhou Lianxi, Zhang Hengqu, and the two Cheng of the Northern Song: making the "sage within" primary. Now that they had established the primacy of the sage within, then what they had to discuss before all else was morals. What is "sage within" [*nei sheng*]? It meant governing the self within, doing the work of becoming a sage [*shengren*], and erecting our own moral character. "King without [*wai wang*]" meant in our external life to enter politics so as to bring about the Kingly Way [*wang dao*]. The sage-within work is one which every man can do, as Mencius has stated: "If I can get it by seeking and I can lose it by discarding, then seeking is helpful to getting." This is not always the case with king-without. That is something that "If there is Dao in my seeking it and there is Fate in my getting it, then seeking does not help the getting." The work of being a sage within can be done by everyone, and can certainly be done. This is the first principle. Since this first principle was one they all acknowledged, then Master Zhu must surely have acknowledged it too.

Master Zhu was a *lixuejia* philosopher, one who appointed himself as representing the transmission and moral tradition of Dao [*Dao tong*]. But what defined Dao lay in the area of the sage within, not that of the king without, or worldly achievement. Since this is the case, we then have to preach in terms of the sage within, which is precisely what

thinkers like Zhou Lianxi, Zhang Hengqu, Cheng Mingdao, Lu Xiangshan, Wang Yangming, and Liu Jishan did. And in terms of the sage within, *nijue*, reflective realization, was precisely the essential and crucial pivot, while the path of convenient acquisition [*shunqu*] characterized by *gewu qiongli* [investigating things in order to fathom *li* [Reason/Principle/Universal Truth] did not correspond to it. Consequently the moral practice of being guided by reflective realization was the essential moral practice. This did not mean that in our concrete life we have no need of knowledge. From the overall perspective of our concrete life, we also need knowledge and can engage in other pursuits. If you like mathematics, you may go and study mathematics; it won't hold you back. But one should decide where priorities lie and should not fail to distinguish them. That is a point that Master Zhu failed to discern. People in general recognized Master Zhu as exemplifying the true doctrine, but they did not necessarily grasp the real issue. That is why, even if it is not from the perspective of the present-day, but from the perspective of the past, Master Zhu's approach was not exactly correct. All the same, Master Zhu was generally recognized as embodying the true doctrine, and he likewise thought so himself, that his teaching was best and most appropriate. But in fact it was precisely when he thought so that his mind failed to elevate itself, and fell instead onto a level roughly similar to that of the average person. And that was inadequate.

Seen in such broad terms, then, the difference in moral practice was determined by the different understanding of substance. Because Master Zhu tread the path of *gewu qiongli* [fathoming *li* by means of investigating things], his understanding of the moral mind [*xin*], of one's moral nature [*xing*], and of Dao diverged from the understanding of those who tread the path of reflective realization. This is where the two parties separated. The divergence at this locus was not very great because although they spoke a great deal on these subjects, their focus was very concentrated, all centering on this point. But this very small divergence resulted in a tremendous influence because all their questions issued from this locus.

Mind [*xin*] as understood in the moral practice of Master Zhu pertained to the mind of the “spirit of *qi* [*qi zhi ling* 氣之靈].” Mind pertained to *qi* [material force] and was therefore physical, not metaphysical. He did not have “the original mind [*ben xin*]” described by Mencius, Wang Yangming, or Lu Xiangshan. The minute he talked about

mind it belonged to *qi*, and was physical, not metaphysical. Then what was metaphysical? That was *li*, reason, Principle. *Xing* [one's moral nature] was metaphysical; *xing* was simply *li*, reason. Thus one's mind [*xin*] and reason [*li*] were two entities here; they were separated and could not be joined. Because mind pertained to the physical while one's moral nature [*xing*] pertained to the metaphysical, moral nature was simply *li*, reason, Principle. Thus reason did not contain the active component, mind. Likewise with Dao-substance [*Daoti*]. Thus nature-substance and Dao-substance as understood by Zhu Zi may be described in modern terms as "mere being but not active." In other words they are "mere reason." This is incompatible with the understanding of the pre-Qin Confucians, who did not understand one's nature-substance [*xingti*, moral capacity, moral ability] and Dao-substance in this way. But it was natural for Master Zhu's analytical path to lead him to this understanding. He thought that this understanding was most correct and that the understanding of others a great muddle.

According to the path of reflective realization, mind was not physical. It was not "the spirit of *qi*" [*qi zhi ling*], but had to be viewed through the "original mind [*benxin*]" described by Mencius. This was the so-called "*xinti*" [mind-substance, moral mind, moral ability]; mind was simply ontological substance [*benti*]. Here mind does not pertain to the physical, to *qi* [material force]. Mind was simply *li* [reason, Principle]. Here mind is described in terms of *li*, not in terms of *qi*. Consider Wang Yangming's "*liangzhi*". It cannot be said to pertain to *qi*, for if it pertained to *qi*, then it would be physical, which would be a disaster. Thus the moral mind [*xinti*] was explained through *li*; it was *li*. Hence the statement: "Mind is *li* [*xin ji li*]." Lu and Wang could say "Mind is simply *li* [reason, Principle]." Master Zhu, however, could not say "Mind is simply *li*." He could only say "[One's moral] nature is simply *li* [*xing ji li*]," for to him mind and reason were two different entities, belonging to two different spheres. One's moral nature was *li*, belonging to the metaphysical sphere; mind was *qi*, belonging to the physical sphere. The two were different and had to be separated. That is why I distinguish these two kinds of ontological substances with two statements. The ontological substance as understood by the path of reflective realization is "Both Being and active." The ontological substance as understood by Zhu Zi is "Being only but not active," because the active component belongs to *qi*; it has all collapsed down. Mind also

belongs to *qi*; it has also dropped down, has dropped by the side as it were. Of course there is indeed a part of mind that belongs to *qi*. For example, the psychological mind that we talk about nowadays belongs to *qi*; it is material. But *liangzhi* and what Mencius called “original mind” are not psychological. Using Kant’s language, they are transcendental and cannot be explained as *qi*. That is why I have used two statements to separate them. These are not arbitrary statements. If you look at them carefully you will see that the statements are necessarily so. The active part is in the mind. Only the mind can be active. If there is only reason and no mind, then reason cannot be active. But do not think that just because it is active that it will be physical and pertain to *qi*. There is activity that pertains to *qi*, and activity that does not pertain to *qi*. This is a point Master Zhu did not sort out. Later on the debate between Master Zhu and Lu Xiangshan was still concerned with this question. The crux was still here. If their understanding of ontological substance was different, that of *gongfu*, moral cultivation, would naturally be different.

After I saw this point, I sorted out the three philosophers of the Northern Song, then sorted out the philosophy of Cheng Yichuan. Then I saw that Hu Wufeng’s thought accorded with the thought of the first three philosophers of the Northern Song and with the original meaning of Confucianism. Just now I said that ontological substance is “Both Being and active”. This was the ancient meaning of pre-Qin Confucianism. The *Doctrine of the Mean* and *Yijing* Commentaries of pre-Qin Confucianism were all understood this way. For example, when Confucius discussed *ren* [humanity, humaneness] in the *Analects*, *ren* was not only just *li*. It was *xin*, mind, as well as *li*. But according to Master Zhu’s explanation, *ren* is just *li*, reason, not mind. One was only allowed to say *renli* [*ren*-reason] and *ren*-Dao, but not allowed to say *renxin*[*ren*-mind]. This is strange and bizarre, and goes against commonsense. But according to Master Zhu’s analysis, *ren* was only *li*, reason. One could speak of it as *li*, as Dao, but not as mind. Mind pertained to the physical, to *qi*. But Confucius pointed out *ren* precisely from the perspective of being “not at ease” [*bu an*, uneasy]<sup>6</sup>. Is not “not at ease” mind? That is why Master Zhu did not have the head for explaining the *Analects*; nor could he explain Mencius, the *Doctrine of the Mean*, and the *Yijing* Commentaries. He could only explain the *Great Learning* and, aside from that, Xun Zi [3<sup>rd</sup> cent. BCE philosopher]. His

mentality was the mentality of Xun Zi. That is why I have attached special importance to Hu Wufeng and pointed him out. Although he did not have the towering position of Cheng, Zhu, Lu, and Wang, it did not prevent his philosophical framework from having a unique significance.

The second volume of *Moral Mind and Moral Nature* [*Mind-substance and Nature-substance, Xinti yu Xingtí*] deals with the three men Cheng Mingdao, Cheng Yichuan, and Hu Wufeng. The third volume is devoted to Master Zhu. It is the largest volume, giving a detailed and systematic account of Zhu's thought. The first volume deals with the two men Zhou Lianxi and Zhang Hengqu. Zhu was the most prolific writer of them all. His *Yu Lei* [*Classified Conversations*] is large and then there is his *Collected Writings* [*Wen Ji*]. It is not enough to simply read his *Classified Conversations*; one must also read the *Collected Writings*. These of course are voluminous but you need only read what is germane. Who can possibly read all his writings? That is why whenever people teach Zhu Zi they bring out his *Classified Conversations* and randomly copy out those sections from the first five *juan* dealing with Heaven and Earth, yin and yang, and ghosts and spirits. As a result, no one has been able to really understand Master Zhu's thought. It is impossible to understand him by randomly quoting a few statements from his *Classified Conversations*. Of course if once having understood him you then quote a few statements from him to illustrate other questions, that is no problem and can't be called irresponsible. But you can't do this if you are giving a formal course on him. But since Master Zhu has written so much, how do you go about teaching him? You must first understand the development of his thought, understand the questions that concerned him and on which he focused his efforts. That is where you begin. He began with the question of “*zhong he*” [literally, the Middle/Center and Harmony; also translated centrality and harmony, balance and harmony].

This question of *zhong he* got muddled beginning from Cheng Yichuan. Su Jiming 蘇季明 asked him about it again and again and the more he asked the more complicated it got.<sup>7</sup> The question was originally really very simple. The *Doctrine of the Mean* says: “Before joy, anger, sorrow and happiness arise, that is called *zhong* [*zhong*, Middle/Mean/Center; balance]. When they have arisen and hit the right chord, that is

called *he* [harmony]. *Zhong* is the great ground of all under Heaven. *He* is the universal way of all under Heaven. [喜怒哀樂之未發調之中，發而皆中節謂之和。中也者天下之大本也，和也者天下之達到也。]” The statement is quite clear. But as soon as this question was considered by Cheng Yichuan it got complicated, with a resultant effect on Master Zhu. Master Zhu spent a lot of energy on the question of *zhong he*. He was then thirty-seven years old. When at thirty-two he saw his teacher Li Yanping [1093-1163], Li told him to study this question, and to use it as a starting point for his moral practice. But at that time he was unable to understand the question. It was only when he reached thirty-seven that he began to ponder it. By then he was no longer young. He had obtained the *jinshi* degree at twenty-four and of course had read some books and understood a few things. But that kind of knowledge cannot count. A person’s thinking must stabilize. As Confucius put it, “At thirty I was able to stand up, at forty I was able to be without doubt.” [*Analects*, II.iv.2]. One has to have an explicit position, and this requires discipline and solid effort. Thus although he knew a lot of things before this it couldn’t count. It was only now that he really began to apply himself and ponder this question, spending several years on it. But at the time no one understood the question of *zhong he*, nor did anyone do what Master Zhu did, start explaining moral practice from the problem of *zhong he*. For this originally simple matter became very complicated and muddled in his hands. What is more, he even made a distinction between an Old Theory of *Zhong He* and a New Theory of *Zhong He*. He thought up the old theory when he was thirty-seven or thirty-eight. At that time he thought he understood the question of *zhong he* and he discussed it continually with Zhang Nanxuan [1133-1180] in several letters.<sup>8</sup> When he reached forty he suddenly felt that it was all wrong and he gave it up as being absurd and perverse. This discarded material was the Old Theory of *Zhong He*, while the theory he advanced after this awakening was the New Theory of *Zhong He*. Once he arrived at the new theory his system of thought was more or less complete. After the New Theory of *Zhong He* he wrote “*Ren Shuo*” [Theory of *Ren*], and once this was done his entire system of thought was fixed.

Thus I first spent an enormous effort in sorting out the Old Theory of *Zhong He* and the New Theory of *Zhong He*, starting out from Cheng Yichuan. One must start from this question in arranging and making selections from Master Zhu’s writings. Once you

have understood this question then you have understood his entire thought. But in the *Song-Yuan Xuean* [*Studies of Song and Yuan Philosophers*] the “Huiweng Xuean” is the most poorly edited, the reason being that Huang Lizhou [Huang Zongxi, 1610-1698] had no idea where to begin. Zhu Zi’s writings being so numerous, which writings should he selected for inclusion as representative of Zhu's thought? Huang could only copy out a bit here and a bit there. Although the three men Cheng Mingdao, Cheng Yichuan and Master Zhu are the major pillars of the *lixuejia*, the accounts of their philosophy in the book *Song-Yuan Xuean* are the poorest. The reason why “Huiweng Xuean” [*The Life and Philosophy of Huiweng*] was so badly written was because his writings were so voluminous that the average scholar was unable to understand its development, to grasp the essential threads that ran through them, or to separate the fine from the dross. Even Huang Lizhou’s wide erudition did not prevent him from producing an edition that was disorganized and confusing. That was because he had no understanding of the problem of *zhong he*. He knew of the problem, but had an insufficient understanding of its intricacies. That was why he turned out to be such a poor editor.

“Mingdao Xuean” [*The Life and Philosophy of Mingdao*] and “Yichuan Xuean” [*The Life and Philosophy of Yichuan*] were also poorly edited. The reason was this: A large part of the writings left behind by Cheng Mingdao and Cheng Yichuan consisted of “Sayings of the Two Teachers” [*Er xianshen yu*], indicating that they were utterances of these two men. But it was not clear which were the utterances of Cheng Mingdao and which those of Cheng Yichuan. Since they were jumbled together, and seemed to be all alike, one could ascribe the utterances to either Cheng Mingdao or Cheng Yichuan. What Master Zhu did, as I have already observed, was to make Cheng Yichuan the standard. Anything that was inconsistent with Cheng Yichuan but uttered by Cheng Mingdao met with his disapproval. Thus the “two Cheng” became “one Cheng.” But in reality the “two Cheng” were two Cheng, not one Cheng. When it came to Huang Lizhou to write *Song-Yuan Xuean*, he still could not tell them apart but attributed many of Cheng Mingdao’s utterances to Cheng Yichuan and vice versa. Nor was there any systematic organization. He would copy out a passage here and a passage there. That is why the studies of these two philosophers were dismal. So at this point we cannot look at *Song-*

*Yuan Xuean*. Nor can we look at *Song-Yuan Xuean* if we want to understand Master Zhu's philosophy. We must look at his own writings.

That is why I have spent a great deal of effort separating the writings of Cheng Mingdao and Cheng Yichuan as well as editing them. This is a work of discriminating and selecting, and not of textual criticism. It is not a matter of having a text in which the two men cannot be separated and finding a different text where it is possible to separate them. It is not a question of comparing texts but of understanding the philosophies. If one understands the different philosophies then one would naturally be able to determine which utterances were from Cheng Yichuan and which from Cheng Mingdao. The temperaments of the two brothers were different and their understanding of substance and *gongfu* was also different. And these differences can be determined. But this requires understanding. If one has no understanding, then one will do what Fung Yulan [1895-1990] did in his *History of Chinese Philosophy* [1934], put words that clearly came from Cheng Mingdao into the mouth of Cheng Yichuan. He did this because he lacked understanding of their philosophies. That the two brothers were of different temperaments is known to everyone. But how the temperamental differences affected their philosophical principles is not known to the average scholar. That is why I expended a great deal of effort in transcribing those writings. Writing studies on them requires a great deal of time and work. It cannot be done in haste. I transcribed their writings over and over again and gradually discerned their natural order. The result of my editorial efforts are eight discourses by Cheng Mingdao and eight by Cheng Yichuan, all of them in my *Xinti yu Xingti*. It is after this determination that we can go on to discuss their philosophies. Thus we have to re-write "Mingdao *Xuean*", "Yichuan *Xuean*", and "Huiweng *Xuean*". The studies of these three philosophers in the *Song-Yuan Xuean* are completely unacceptable. These are the only *Xuean* that are problematic. The others are not problematic. For instance, there is no question about "Lianxi *Xuean*" because Zhou Lianxi left only that small body of writing, all included by Huang Lizhou, so there was no problem. Nor is there any question about "Hengqu *Xuean*" because Zhang Hengqu's writings consisted mostly of *Zheng Meng* [*Correcting Youthful Ignorance*] and Huang Lizhou included all of it. He also added *Xi Ming* [*Western*

*Inscription*], and so on, and various *Yu Lu* [*Recorded Conversations*]. These too are of course unproblematic. Thus understanding is crucial to discussing these questions.

Much as we hold Master Zhu to be misguided in his path of *gewu zhizhi*, extending knowledge through investigating things, and that he was excessive in his emphasis on his “*dao wen xue*” [treading the path of study and inquiry], we must admit that he was a great philosopher among the *lixuejia*. His mind was the mind of Xun Zi, his thought processes a little like Plato's. But the orientation of Western philosophical development was different from that of China. Starting from Confucius and Mencius, the first product of Confucian thought was what Heidegger called “the ethics of orientation” [*Richtungsethik*].<sup>9</sup> The *Analects*, *Mencius*, the *Doctrine of the Mean*, and *Yijing* Commentaries all fell under the ethics of orientation. The teachings of Zhou Lianxi, Zhang Hengqu, Cheng Mingdao, Hu Wufeng, Lu Xiangshan, Wang Yangming, and Liu Jishan, who came after them, likewise fell under the ethics of orientation. In the West the father of the ethics of orientation was Kant. Ethics prior to Kant Heidegger called “the ethics of essence” [*Wesensethik*],<sup>10</sup> which is very apt. In the latter, moral laws and the good are determined on the basis of essence. In Kant's words, the good was determined on the basis of ontological perfection.<sup>11</sup> The good was determined on the basis of being. Kant reversed this by not determining the good on the basis of being. As a result, starting from Kant there was the ethics of orientation. But Confucianism had the ethics of orientation from the very beginning, and only with Master Zhu did the ethics of essence appear. This was the exact reverse of philosophy in the West. Of course we can also say that in the pre-Qin period Xun Zi represented the ethics of essence. But Xun Zi in the pre-Qin period did not rise to the position of the true doctrine. Nor did the *lixuejia* philosophers who came later find him appealing. Actually, Master Zhu should have liked Xun Zi because both of them propounded the ethics of essence, which in the eyes of the Confucians was certainly not the true doctrine. But, regardless of these differences, it must be conceded that the ethics of essence as represented by Plato or St. Thomas Aquinas was no small achievement.

In teaching the ethics of essence, Zhu Zi emphasized objective being. This is fairly acceptable and has its merits, just as Plato and Aquinas have their merits in the West. But granted their merits, the correctness or incorrectness of the standard of truth or

falsehood must still be distinguished and must not be confounded. Thus the "Zhu Zi *Xuean*" must be carefully sorted out and its contours made clear. Only then will we be able to discern the different contours of Song and Ming philosophical development over a span of 600 years. That is why after I completed the three-volume *Xinti yu Xingtí* I sorted out the philosophical development that stretched from Lu Xiangshan to Liu Jishan, although for a long time I did not commit it to writing. Later on I published a series of different pieces, but it was only last year that I finally completed the project. Now the book has been proofed and is in press [and since published]. This fourth volume is very important. You may do well to look at it carefully because the Confucian philosophy of the sage-within reaches its highest pinnacle here. But you need to understand the first three volumes. Unless you have a clear grasp of the first three volumes, you will not be able to understand the fourth.

In the 38<sup>th</sup> or 39<sup>th</sup> year of the Republic [1949 or 1950], after I had just arrived in Taiwan, I wrote a small volume, *Wang Yangming's Zhi Liangzhi Jiao* [*Wang Yangming's Teaching on Bringing Forth Liangzhi*]. At the time I was not too clear on the relation between Wang's philosophy and that of the other *lixuejia* philosophers. It is true that Wang Yangming's philosophy can stand on its own, but if one wants to discuss it accurately, precisely, and clearly, it is best that he not be considered as standing alone. That is because Wang was after all still a *lixuejia* philosopher. At that time I had not clearly sorted out the relation between Zhu Zi and Zhou Lianxi, Zhang Hengqu, Cheng Mingdao and Cheng Yichuan. That is why most of the conclusions regarding this aspect were unreliable. So I have discarded that small volume, merely keeping one chapter, "Zhi Zhi Yinan [Perplexities on Developing *Liangzhi*]", and appending it to the chapter on Wang Yangming in the volume *From Lu Xiangshan to Liu Jishan* [*Cong Lu Xiangshan dao Liu Jishan*].

That is why a person's progress in understanding often falls into several levels. Of course previously I understood a number of things, but they don't count. For instance, I can explain certain things to you, but how much of it can you actually absorb? How many concepts can enter into your life? That is a vexing problem in the learning process. You have to climb up level by level, advance step by step. By the time I arrived in Hong Kong I was already fifty, when my level of understanding was already relatively high. It

does not matter that I did not understand all that previously. If I didn't understand it yesterday, I can still understand it today. To understand it at that time was appropriate, since I had reached a higher level of understanding. That is why these later books, *Caixing yu Xuanli* [*Material-Nature and Xuan Metaphysical Principles*], *Xinti yu Xingti*, *Foxing yu Bore* [*Buddha-Nature and Prajñā*], are more reliable. But to reach this stage requires discipline; it is not enough to simply understand a few sentences. Take, for example, the development of Buddhism in the six or seven hundred years since the Southern and Northern dynasties. I had some understanding of it, but that couldn't count. True understanding is when one can objectively trace the development of the major schools of Buddhist thought after Buddhism entered China. One has to examine numerous writings before one can treat each point of view properly. I spent eight years on this effort. I would suggest that you not read the books I wrote before the age of fifty.

Generally speaking, the trouble with people is not that they don't have enough brains, but that they don't give enough effort to studying the writings. All they do is quote a few passages and explain them a bit. That is irresponsible, and such efforts don't amount to anything. All it can do is show off one's intelligence and allow one to dilate on one's views subjectively. It does not represent an effort to understand the matter objectively. That is why we must raise our level of understanding; we must be more thorough. And this requires sustained effort, which cannot be hastened but must take time. Of course we do not have to be like those who do textual criticism, going everywhere to check data or search for editions, but we should always pay attention to relevant texts. For example, when we discuss the problem of *zhong he* in Zhu Zi, we should understand all the basic materials on *zhong he* step by step. This calls for discipline, and after a period of sustained discipline these concepts will fall into place naturally. Whenever we first study a problem, the concepts will be fluid, but after some time they will gell. Actually these fluid things are not concepts but ourselves. Concepts themselves have their own proper places. Thus subjective understanding is seldom in accord with the original meaning of objective concepts. This work must be done. Only this can be counted as scholarship, can demonstrate an objective position. But who in this day and age is willing to undertake this kind of effort? Everyone is impatient for success. As soon as they graduate from college they say Confucius in his day

established himself at thirty, here we are at thirty and haven't yet established ourselves, we must hurry. When they have gotten their Ph.D.s at thirty they think they are learned and so they want to produce a major work. Actually they simply won't pass muster, as they have barely started their learning process. A Ph.D. means you have just stepped in the door, it just means you can now make a living in this line of work. It doesn't mean you are now a great scholar. So one simply has to make this effort. Once you have turned thirty you have entered middle age and so you want to make a name for yourself as well as win success. The middle-aged person is intensely career-oriented; so one is diverted very easily.

Let me take Mr. Tang [Tang Junyi, 1909-1978] as an example. His powers of discernment were of a very high order, his thought maturing before he turned thirty. His *Daode zhi Ziwo Jianli* [*Establishment of the Moral Self*] is excellent and shows that his thought was already formed. As a professor of Chinese philosophy at Zhongyang University [Central University], his books on Buddhism and Song-Ming *lixuejia* were all based on his thought of this earlier period. When he was nearing forty, we fled to Hong Kong as refugees. During the first ten years, which was filled with hardship, he did not do any research but simply lectured on Chinese culture at the level of understanding he had previously reached, and he lectured very well. All those articles he wrote on cultural questions were very good. This continued till he was fifty. Thus the articles Mr. Tang produced in the twenty years between the age of thirty and fifty, on establishing the moral self, on the experience of life and on questions of culture, were all fairly good and marked his peak.

After fifty he came out to work on founding the New Asia Academy [a precursor of Chinese University of Hong Kong] and to take part in its administration. He became more career-oriented and got diverted. Of course, participating in practical affairs is not bad per se because Confucianism speaks of being a sage within and king without. Taking part in practical affairs is quite proper. But as soon as you take part in practical affairs it will affect your scholarly work. Practical affairs will not adversely affect one's subjective understanding of life, but it will handicap one's effort at serious scholarship. That is why during the twenty years after Mr. Tang turned fifty he did not make much progress in scholarship. To be sure he wrote quite a few books—his *Zhونغguo Zhexue*

*Yuan Lun* [*Fundamental Discussion of Chinese Philosophy*] alone is several volumes—which are rich in analysis and interpretation, but from an objective standpoint they contain many questionable areas. In the main these books can only be regarded as “rough work” that needs revision. His level of understanding did not advance because he was still writing on the basis of the level of understanding he had reached around the age of thirty. All he did was increase the quantity of raw material. Since he possessed such high powers of discernment and was such a quick student, where did the problem lie? It lay in his becoming distracted during those twenty years. To do this kind of work you have to shut the door and let your mind settle down. During the day he had to perform his administrative duties and struggle with others, while coming home in the evening he had to study and write. Although he was a fast reader, what he absorbed was actually quite rough. His quotes are in the main unreliable because he was too busy. These errors are very easily corrected, but his level of understanding could not improve. I felt it a great pity that his level of understanding did not make much progress after the age of thirty. Scholarly questions are questions of objective understanding and do not belong to the subjective sphere or one’s personal thought. On the strength of one’s personal thought one can discuss cultural questions, but not objective scholarly questions. Thus Mr. Tang’s scholarship matured and peaked before the age of fifty; besides, his personality was suitable for discussing cultural questions.

Thus this sort of discipline must be undertaken and one must have a sufficient level of understanding. Master Zhu started to seriously ponder questions starting from the age of thirty-seven. Most scholars do not have enough understanding before they are forty because they are still struggling and feeling their way. Nowadays most people get their Ph.D.s around the age of thirty and become professors around forty. But at this age they are still unable to really handle questions. Their articles are still tentative and don’t amount to much. This shows that it is very difficult to understand a problem. If you wish to discuss the theoretical foundations of literature, you must have a clear concept of literature, which is by no means easy. You have to put several decades of serious work into literature, whether it is creative writing, literary appreciation, or criticism. You have to have considerable knowledge of these areas and your understanding must be quite deep before you can form a concept of literature. Then based on this conceptualization

you have to reflect on the theoretical foundation of literature because the theoretical foundation is implied in this conceptualization, and you should not chatter about concepts that are extrinsic or irrelevant to your conceptualization. But this is immensely difficult. In the past when Liu Xie [465?-532?] wrote his *Wen Xin Diao Long*[The Literary Mind and the Carving of Dragons] he had a clear conceptualization of literature. Although that was literary theory in the old style, it required reaching the level of understanding that Liu Xie possessed when he wrote *Wen Xin Diao Long*. That book discussed literature and did not drag in extraneous matter. Can you understand literature? Can you understand philosophy? Normally when we study philosophy we only know a few terms. Only later after we have tentatively made progress can we form a conceptualization of philosophy and discuss it. But to reach a conceptualization of philosophy is by no means easy. How much work it takes!

That is why I have been thinking about it these past few years and decided that I must write this book *From Lu Xiangshan to Liu Jishan*. This is the most subtle of the four volumes. Although the first three volumes opened up the line of reasoning and thought, they did not reach the heart of the matter. As for this book, I had written a number of articles, but still failed to write one on Lu Xiangshan. I wrote about the debate between Lu Xiangshan and Master Zhu twenty or thirty years ago in my book *Xinti yu Xingt*, which was relatively easy to do because it involved questions on which they had left many writings. But Lu Xiangshan's own thought is difficult to explain because of its extreme simplicity. Most of his statements are made to refute Master Zhu, but his own position is very difficult to explain. It can be expressed in a few words and cannot make an article. Thus I was unable to start writing about the style or content of his own philosophy. His thought consisted of just a few statements such as "First establish the great."<sup>12</sup> That says it all. How can it make an article? It was only last year that I was able to put it all together and describe the core of his thought using a special style of presentation. We must first present his thought in an integrated fashion and only then discuss his debate with Master Zhu. In this way we can increase our understanding of the debate as well as arrive at an understanding of Lu Xiangshan himself.

Wang Yangming was easier to discuss because his thought is analytical. Lu Xiangshan's philosophy is not analytical. The analytical portion that he assumed was all

in *Mencius*. Wang Yangming's philosophy employed the analysis of the *Great Learning* to counter Zhu Zi and turn around Zhu Zi. It was thus relatively easy to discuss. But the development of Wang Yangming's philosophy from Wang Longxi [1498-1583] through the Taizhou school and the Jiangyou school down to Liu Jishan contained questions of great subtlety and is by no means easy to explain. Usually when scholars explain Song-Ming *lixuejia* they do not touch upon these questions. These questions developed out of *xinxue*, the philosophy of mind, and were far more subtle than the questions of the Northern Song period.

The development of Wang Yangming's philosophy was divided into three schools of thought: Wang Longxi and Qian Xushan [1496-1574] of the Zhezhong [Central Zhejiang] school in the native village of Wang Yangming; Wang Gen [1483-1540] and Lo Jinxi [1515-88] of the Taizhou school in Jiangsu; Nie Shuangjiang [1487-1563] and Lo Nianan [1504-1563] of the Jiangyou [Right Bank] school in Jiangsu. In order to understand these three schools one must put in some effort and not simply follow the common interpretation. The common interpretation is based on the *Ming Ru Xuean* [*Lives and Works of the Ming Confucians*].

Huang Lizhou's editing and writing of *Song-Yuan Xuean* and *Ming Ru Xuean* were a great contribution to the history of scholarship. He does not appear to have been a novice in this area. Having read so many works, he would naturally have had some understanding of the subject, but, all the same, it was a superficial understanding. *Ming Ru Xuean* was his most carefully written work. Although he did not direct any criticism against the Wang Yangming school of philosophy he did not really understand Wang philosophy; nor did he understand its later development in such men as Wang Longxi, Lo Jinxi, Lo Nianan, Nie Shuangjiang and others. At the beginning of each of his studies of these philosophers he gave a summary, which then almost invariably became the basis of a discussion of the philosopher by other scholars. But most of his assessments were wrong. For example, he said the Right Bank school was a direct descendant of Wang Yangming's philosophy,<sup>13</sup> which was wrong and showed that he did not understand the Right Bank [Jiangyou] school. He also treated Wang Longxi as Chan [Zen] because Wang Longxi made some very abstruse statements.<sup>14</sup> Since they were incomprehensible to most scholars due to the great distance in time, they called him Chan. In the past there

was a taboo against Chan Buddhism among scholars, but it was really a stricture based on ignorance. Huang Lizhou treated the Taizhou school in a similar fashion, looking upon philosophers like Lo Jinxi as Chan.<sup>15</sup> All he wished to do was preserve the Confucian position of Wang Yangming and prevent it from becoming Chan thought in the hands of his disciples. But this was to base his understanding only on the extrinsic and the irrelevant.

In fact, among the Right Bank school only a few bona fide disciples qualified as heirs to Wang Yangming's vision, for all the rest were unreliable, especially Nie Shuangjiang and Lo Nianan, who were the first to attack Wang Longxi. Wang Longxi may have had his perverse and wild side, and he may have been at a slight remove from Wang Yangming, but the few points for which he was criticized by Nie Shuangjiang and Lo Nianan were extrinsic and irrelevant. On these points criticism of Wang Longxi was tantamount to criticism of Wang Yangming. Those bona fide disciples of Wang Yangming were also criticized by these two men. Their thought had also diverged from the position of the Wang school of philosophy. But Nie Shuangjiang and Lo Nianan had no understanding of Wang Yangming's intellect at all. Huang Lizhou's statement that they were the direct heirs to Wang Yangming's thought is totally frivolous and absurd. Among those bona fide disciples, only two or three could faithfully uphold his thought. Wang Yangming had many students on the Right Bank because his entire career was spent there. His military campaigns (such as the pacification of Zhenhao) were carried out on the Right Bank. His career and his intellectual powers were then at their height and his renown drew many men to his door. But these men did not necessarily understand his thought.

Why did Nie Shuangjiang and Lo Nianan, whose influence was so great, not understand Wang Yangming? There must have been a good reason. Let us first put aside the question of their understanding. They were, in fact, not bona fide disciples of Wang Yangming. Nie Shuangjiang only saw Wang Yangming once in his life. His political position at the time was quite high, certainly not lower than Wang's. Although Wang Yangming's achievement was great, his official position was not considered high. He was only *xunfu* [Grand Coordinator], which was not a permanent position but an ad hoc appointment. Finally, when Wang Yangming arrived in Guangxi to exterminate the

bandits, Nie Shuangjiang wrote him a letter, to which he received a reply, this being the last letter to which Wang Yangming wrote a reply. It is the famous “Letter in Reply to Nie Wenwei.”<sup>16</sup> From this letter one can see that Wang Yangming did not have any great influence on Nie Shuangjiang. Nie Shuangjiang’s interest in philosophy only commenced at this time. And after Wang Yangming successfully quelled the rebellion in Guangxi he died on his way back. When Nie Shuangjiang received news of Wang Yangming’s death he set up a tablet on an altar and offered homage before it, performing the rites of a disciple. Such was the extent of their relation. From the exchange of letters between the two, it is evident that he had just been introduced to the doctrine of “*zhi liangzhi* [bringing forth, reaching *liangzhi*]” and had as yet no understanding of it. Of course after Wang Yangming’s death it was possible for him to read about it and make gradual progress. But by this time he was already prejudiced and no longer young. In the main he did not leave the beaten track of the Northern Song Confucians. He had no understanding at all of the difficult process by which Lu and Wang had made their step-by-step circuitous way out of the thought of the Northern Song Confucians.

Coming now to Lo Nianan, we find that he was even worse than Nie Shuangjiang. He was a rustic of Jiangxi who had the habit of reading the *Chuanxi Lu* [*Instructions for Practical Living*]. The *Chuanxi Lu* was published during Wang Yangming’s lifetime and enjoyed a considerable circulation in society. But he never met Wang Yangming nor did they ever correspond. His thought also stopped at the ideas of the Northern Song Confucians, and he had no understanding of Lu Xiangshan’s attempt to criticize Zhu Zi nor the crucial points where he tried to turn around Zhu Zi’s teachings. After Wang Yangming’s death he did not perform the rites of a disciple nor did he acknowledge that he was a pupil of Wang Yangming. When Wang Yangming’s senior disciples Qian Xushan and Wang Longxi (both from the same village as Wang Yangming and stayed with him the longest) edited the chronology of Wang Yangming’s life, Lo Nianan also took part in some of the work. As a result Qian Xushan wrote him a letter asking him to perform the initiation rites of a disciple. At first he did not comply. He felt that since he had not been accepted as a disciple, he could not forcibly assume the role of a disciple, for it would have been a breach of propriety. Such protestations sounded dignified and impressive, but no doubt they concealed an ulterior motive. It was not certain he

approved of what Wang Yangming had to offer; it was questionable whether he understood him. But Qian Xushan and Wang Longxi were adamant in dragging him in, even to the extent of vouching for his being indeed a disciple of Wang Yangming. This was how he reluctantly joined the fraternity. And it was for this very reason that later on he and Nie Shuangjiang were the first to attack Wang Longxi. Under these circumstances, how could Huang Lizhou say that Nie Shuangjiang and Lo Nianan and others like them were bearers of the true heritage of the Wang school of philosophy? It was a highly tenuous assertion.

Why were they so hostile to Wang Longxi? Wang Longxi was the oldest of the disciples of Wang Yangming. He was also the brightest, being the most gifted and discerning. Although Qian Xushan was also a senior disciple he was of a simple, honest, and unassuming disposition. As a result it was easy for Wang Longxi to become confident and overbearing. This may have been inconsequential to the bona fide disciples but it antagonized Nie Shuangjiang and Lo Nianan, who were not bona fide disciples. As a result of such personal animus, they became the first to rebel and criticize Wang Longxi.

Looking at the writings of the period objectively, we can now see that their castigations were largely misdirected. These writings are now seldom read by scholars, but they contain a major debate in the Wang school of philosophy. I have therefore sorted out the three streams of thought in this school. I found that the true direct heirs to Wang's philosophy are Wang Longxi and Lo Jinxi. Nie Shuangjiang and Lo Nianan do not represent the true Wang philosophy. They have departed from its path and have returned to the Northern Song; on the other hand, they are still in a transitional stage and have not matured. This transition is in the direction of Liu Jishan. Liu Jishan is the last *lixuejia* philosopher. He is latently in agreement with the path of Hu Wufeng, whom we have already observed is the one who started the digestion of the Northern Song Confucians. Liu Jishan belongs to this framework. Thus he comes out of Wang philosophy and returns to the philosophers whom Hu Wufeng continued—the path represented by Lianxi, Hengqu, and Mingdao. Thus the Song-Ming *lixuejia* should be divided into three strands: one strand consisting of Lu and Wang; one of Yichuan and Zhu Zi; and one of Hu Wufeng and Liu Jishan. Of these three strands, the Lu and Wang

strand descends directly from Mencius; Hu Wufeng and Liu Jishan, who continued the strand represented by Lianxi, Hengqu, and Mingdao, comprised the orthodox doctrine of the *lixuejia*. Ultimately these two strands joined together, going back and forth in a great big circle. The remaining questions were concerned with how Yichuan and Zhu Zi were to be refuted, digested, and joined with the circle. These are the main threads of development.

Liu Jishan's path, which followed the thread of Hu Wufeng, was based on Zhang Hengqu's idea of "*jinxin chengxing* [by fully realizing one's mind one realizes one's nature]," which first of all separated mind and nature. According to Lu and Wang, [moral] mind [*xin*] was [moral] nature [*xing*], mind-substance [the moral mind] was nature-substance, and at the same time was Dao-substance. Yichuan and Zhu Zi explained mind and reason [*li*] as two, which they derived from "mind and nature are two." The latter was the origin and the former the derivative. Hu Wufeng at first maintained the separation of mind and nature; hence he propounded "By fully realizing one's mind one realizes one's nature [*jinxin chengxing*]." Here "*cheng* [to take form, to realize]" is the "*cheng*" of "*xingzhe*" [forming, taking shape]; it is not the "*cheng*" [make] which means that something did not exist and now exists. "Nature [*xing*]" is *a priori* and innate but potential. For the potential to be actualized and manifested requires "*jinxin*" [fully realizing the mind]. This is what is meant by "By fully realizing one's mind one realizes one's nature." This idea was first proposed by Zhang Hengqu and was related to the path of Mencius. But Mencius said "By fully realizing one's mind one knows one's nature" [*jinxin zhixing*], not "By fully realizing one's mind one realizes/actualizes one's nature" [*jinxin chengxing*]. *Jinxin zhixing* explains nature in terms of mind. But in Lianxi, Hengqu, Mingdao, Wufeng, and Jishan, mind and nature are separate. Why is this so? It is because they start from the *Doctrine of the Mean* and *Yijing* Commentaries, first explaining Dao, then explaining nature, then turning inward they explained mind. The pre-Qin Confucian philosophers started from the *Analects* and *Mencius*, then developed towards the highest realms of the *Doctrine of the Mean* and *Yijing* Commentaries, whereas the Song *lixuejia* started from the highest realms and turned back. Their paths were different. The Song Confucians started from the *Doctrine of the Mean* and *Yijing* Commentaries and first explained Dao and one's autonomous

moral ability [*xingtí*, nature-substance], which is to explain objectively. But how do we in this way understand the concrete content and genuine meaning of Dao and one's moral ability? We must do so through "mind," returning to the *Analects* and *Mencius*. That is why it is necessary to speak of "by fully realizing one's mind one realizes one's nature" [*jinxin chengxing*]. This "cheng" [realizing, shaping] is the "cheng" [shaping, realizing] of *gongfu* [moral effort], not the "cheng" that means something which did not exist now exists. If so, then the content of the [moral] mind and the content of the [moral] nature must be the same. That is why our understanding of Dao, whether we start from mind or from nature, is that it "is both Being and active" [*ji cun you ji huodong*即存有即活動]. Only in this way can we explain "By fully realizing one's mind one realizes one's [moral] nature." But Master Zhu could not say this. He could only say "*gewu qiongli*" [By investigating things one will fathom Reason-Principle], making the physical mind merge with *li*, Reason-Principle. Neither did Lu and Wang say *jinxin chengxing* [By fully realizing one's mind one realizes one's moral nature.] Instead they said "*xin ji li (xing)*" [mind is reason (moral nature)]. These three positions defined the three strands.

Although Hu Wufeng and Liu Jishan separated mind from moral nature, they at the same time affirmed that they had being and were active [*ji cunyou ji huodong*], and ultimately the two were merged into one, where mind was moral nature—but by way of a detour. Lu and Wang, however, did not go through this detour. (Cheng Yichuan and Zhu Zi, who tread the knowledge path, also did not take this detour.) Thus these two systems could combine into one to become the orthodox doctrine of Confucianism. Yichuan and Zhu Zi were not the orthodox school. I have called them "*bie zi wei zong*" [another son establishing another lineage]. What is "*bie zi*"? This *bie zi* comes from *The Book of Rites* [*Li Ji*].<sup>17</sup> For example, let us take two brothers, where the older is the direct heir, born of the wife proper. He represents the direct line of descent, succeeding his father. The second brother is not at home but has moved abroad, where he starts another house, establishes another lineage. This is called "*bie zi wei zong*." This was the position taken by Zhu Zi. Zhu Zi's followers today take umbrage at the phrase "another son establishing another lineage," believing it to detract from the dignity of Zhu Zi. How does it detract from the dignity of Zhu Zi? Is it not a great achievement to start another lineage? The Zhu Zi tradition is the Zhu Zi tradition while the Confucius tradition is the

Confucius tradition, the two not always compatible. Although Zhu Zi is separated from us by seven or eight hundred years, we must go through his annotations whenever we read the *Four Books*. Confucius is too distant from us while Zhu Zi is somewhat closer. This has been an advantage to him, and it is why he has been regarded as the direct descendant.

The philosophy of the Liu Jishan school is not pure Wang Yangming philosophy. It is also different from Cheng Yichuan and Zhu Zi. It descends from Hu Wufeng and his digestion of the first three Northern Song philosophers. First, mind and nature were established as separate, and then through this Wang Yangming's philosophy was absorbed. This is its framework, which has its merits. The doctrine of the school of Lu and Wang starts from the mind. This naturally has its excellent points, among them directness and simplicity, but it also has its defects. These defects can be avoided by the Hu Wufeng and Liu Jishan path. The defects of the *lixuejia* that are generally perceived by scholars can be avoided here. Huang Lizhou did not understand this framework. While he misjudged the Right Bank school, he also failed to understand his teacher. Liu Jishan and Huang Lizhou's father were good friends, the latter a member of the Dongling Party [Dongling Dang] who was killed by Wei Zhongxian [1568-1627]. That is why Huang Lizhou hid an iron pick in his sleeve and went up to Beijing to kill the imperial eunuch. As a youth, he had become a student of Liu Jishan at his father's bidding. But it is difficult to know how much he understood his teacher's doctrines, for he was then very young. Later on, when rebellion convulsed the nation, and the Ming dynasty tottered, he joined the efforts at recovery and fought in military campaigns. Afterwards, seeing the futility of these activities, he returned home to resume his studies. It was in old age when he finished writing the *Song-Yuan Xue'an* and the *Ming Ru Xue'an*. He lived to be over eighty years of age. He was a Confucian polymath, both learned and cultured, but he had insufficient understanding of the *lixuejia*. He was very familiar with such extrinsic things as the management and editing of historical records and writings of the thinkers, but he had insufficient understanding of the intrinsic meaning of those writings. He was also deficient in real *gongfu*. Thus he only half-understood his teacher.

Liu Jishan's philosophy was one of *shendu* [vigilance in solitude]. This contained two levels of meaning: one level spoke of vigilance in solitude on the basis of mind-

substance; another level spoke of it on the basis of nature-substance. The first level, which spoke of *shendu* on the basis of mind, was the *Great Learning*, as when the *Great Learning* said: “To make one’s intent [*yi*] sincere means not to deceive oneself, as when one hates hateful smells and loves lovely sights. This is called being self-sufficient [*ziquan*]. Thus the noble man must be vigilant in solitude. [所謂誠其意者，毋自欺也，如惡惡臭，如好好色，此之謂自慊，故君子必慎其獨也”。] [*The Great Learning*, Commentary, VI.1,2]. “*Yi* [intent]” pertains to mind; hence this is speaking on the basis of mind. The level that spoke of *shendu* on the basis of nature-substance was the *Doctrine of the Mean*, as when the *Doctrine of the Mean* says: “Heaven’s decree is called nature [*xing*性]. To follow nature is called Dao. To cultivate Dao is called teaching [*jiao*教]. Dao cannot be in the slightest departed from. That which can be departed from is not Dao. Therefore the noble man is vigilant where he is not seen, is fearful where he is not detected. Nothing is so apparent as the hidden; nothing so evident as the minute. Therefore the noble man is vigilant in solitude.”[天命之謂性，率性之謂道，修道之謂教。道也者，不可須臾離也，可離非道也。是故君子戒慎乎其所不睹，恐懼乎其所不聞。莫見乎隱，莫顯乎微，故君子必慎其獨也。] [*The Doctrine of the Mean*, chap. 1]. Thus there are two levels of meaning in *shendu*. Huang Lizhou completely failed to understand the level on which his teacher explained *shendu* on the basis of one’s moral nature [*xingti*, nature-substance, one’s moral ability]. He could only understand the level of explaining *shendu* on the basis of making sincere one’s intent. That is why when he wrote the “*Jishan Xue’an*” [Life and Work of Liu Jishan] in *Ming Ru Xuean* he selected a great amount of material but they were without order or system and revealed no outline of pattern. Obviously he did not have an adequate understanding of his teacher.

Liu Jishan’s books are the so-called *Liu Zi Quan Shu* [*Complete Works of Liu Zi*]. I copied out all his major writings. From them one can discern his entire philosophy. His moral practice was deep, but his writing was marred by a mish-mash of ideas, by opaque terms, and sometimes statements deliberately meant to startle. In this he had the habits of the Ming *xiucai* [first level degree-holders], who were certainly a brash lot! The intellectuals of each era had their own habits. Starting at the very beginning with Zhu

Yuanzhang [1328-1398], the Ming dynasty put the *shi* , scholar, above the *dafu* [great minister]. It was especially civil to the *xiuca*i, who was an intellectual, a scholar, and not a high official. He was not yet an official. The intellectuals who were not officials were treated with civility by the emperor because they did not feed at the royal coffers, and having neither power nor position they posed no threat to the throne. Hence, whenever the emperor wanted to send deputies to inspect conditions among the people, he chose young *xiuca*i because they were eager and unafraid to speak out. In this respect Zhu Yuanzhang [the founding emperor] was most astute. But once they became officials, the emperor ceased to treat them with civility. For now they fed from the royal coffers and they wielded power. If the officials and functionaries wanted power, he was not going to treat them with civility, he would kill them all. Not only would he kill them, he would humiliate them. This was the so-called *ting zhang* [administering the cane in front of the court]. They would be beaten on the buttocks in court. Some were beaten unconscious; often the official died from the beating. Wang Yangming also received a beating with the cane in court. But this did not accord with the precepts of traditional Confucianism, which has the statement “The *shi* [scholar-official] may be put to death but may not be shamed [士可殺 不可辱].” This was the rule for the great ministers. Since you have allowed him to be a high official and have conferred title and emolument on him, how can you arbitrarily shame him? Since the Ming dynasty *xiuca*i were very arrogant, they were often the local bullies and wicked magistrates. On the one hand, they could speak for the populace; on the other hand, they could also oppress the populace. Because they were *xiuca*i, no one dared offend them. Mao Zedong [1893-1976] had a hearty dislike of *xiuca*i [intellectuals]. He called them *chou lao jiu* [stinking bastards]. This was the exact opposite of the Ming dynasty. This was why Mao Zedong was most reactionary, a great misfortune for the intellectuals of China. Liu Jishan sometimes unconsciously evinced the habits and airs of the *xiuca*i. He of course would not be the bully, but sometimes he would exaggerate. A scholar should always discuss questions in a plain and honest manner and not give way to exaggeration. Although his writings are sometimes a mish-mash, and sometimes opaque, the truth in them cannot be overlooked. There is real moral practice in them. He did not merely borrow the *lixuejia* name but he exemplified genuine moral practice. And so he finally starved himself to death. Emperor Chongzhen

[1627-1644] of the Ming dynasty hanged himself on Coal Mountain [1644], while Prince Fu [Fu Wang] reigned for one year as Emperor Hongguang before he lost the throne. Jishan then starved himself to death in his native village in Zhejiang [1645]. It is by no means easy to starve oneself to death and it took him thirty some days to die. At first he refused to eat but only drank water. Later he refused to drink and so expired. This is what it means to be a martyr for one's country. It is also bearing the ultimate testimony to this philosophy. That is why the *lixuejia* stopped with Liu Jishan. After the Manchus entered as rulers of China [1644], this philosophy could no longer be taught. The transmission of the philosophy then broke off, bringing us down to the present day.

The three hundred years of the Manchu Qing dynasty has had an enormous effect on the Chinese people. The Communist conquest of the mainland [1949] and our fleeing here as refugees are the consequences of the distortions that took place during the three hundred years of Manchu rule [1644-1911]. That is why if we look at this chapter of our cultural history we will see that the present day is not fortuitous, because from the perspective of Hegel's philosophy of history there was historical necessity, and it goes to show you why a country ought not allow itself to be conquered. The Manchu rule of the Qing dynasty was a military rule, a foreign rule, which was unable to inherit and continue the spirit of traditional Chinese culture, with the result that intellectuals underwent a complete change, one with enormous consequences. That is why the discussion of Chinese thought becomes very dreary after the Ming dynasty. We are simply not interested in discussing the thought of these last three hundred years. It is repulsive. Especially for someone born in this day and age, the development of the Chinese people to the present day has really been repulsive and makes one think of it as being inconceivable.

Transcribed by Ming-huei Lee 李明輝

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<sup>1</sup> A biography of Lu Xiangshan appears in *Ru Lin Zhuan* [*Biographies of Confucian Scholars*].

<sup>2</sup> See Zhuzi, "Zhi Yan Yi Yi" ["Questions about *Understanding Words*].

<sup>3</sup> Cheng Mingdao says: "He who is *ren* holds that Heaven, Earth, and the myriad things are one body, there being nothing that is not oneself." Also: "He who is *ren* coalesces with [all] things into one body." (See *Er Cheng Quan Shu* [Complete Works of the Two Cheng Brothers], *juan 2*, "Er Xiansheng Yu [Conversations of the Two Cheng Brothers]" 2 A.)

<sup>4</sup> Cheng Mingdao says: "Physicians regard someone who does not recognize [feel] pain or itching as someone who is 'not *ren*'. People regard someone who does not feel, who does not recognize moral principles as not *ren*. This comparison is most apt." (*Er Cheng Quan Shu*, *juan 2*, "Er Xiansheng Yu " 2A). [Editors' note to the Chinese edition: This passage is not annotated as one from Yichuan or Mingdao, but we follow Mr. Mou in attributing it to Mingdao.]

<sup>5</sup> *Er Cheng Quan Shu* [Complete Works of the Two Cheng Brothers], *juan 19*, "Yichuan Xiansheng Yu [Conversations of Yichuan]" 4.

<sup>6</sup> This refers to *Analects* 17.21. Zai Wo asked Confucius whether it was good enough to observe a mourning period of one year for one's parents instead of three years. Confucius replied that he could do it if he felt at ease eating good rice and wearing embroidered clothes after only one year of mourning.

<sup>7</sup> *Er Cheng Quan Shu* [Complete Works of the Two Cheng Brothers], *juan 19*, "Yichuan Xiansheng Yu" [Sayings of Yichuan] 4.

<sup>8</sup> *Zhu Wen Gong Wenji* [The Writings of Zhu Wen Gong], *juan 32*, "Da Zhang Jinfu Shiba Shu" [Eighteen Letters in Response to Zhang Jinfu], letters 3 and 4.

<sup>9</sup> See Max Müller, *Existenzphilosophie im geistigen Leben der Gegenwart* (Heidelberg: F. H. Kerle Verlag, 1958). Mr. Zhang Kang 張康's Chinese translation of this work appeared in *Xiandai Xueren* [Contemporary Scholar] magazine, no. 4, under the title "Cunzai Zhuyi Zai Dangdai Sixiangjie Zhi Yiyi [The Significance of Existentialism in Contemporary Philosophy]". Ethics of orientation is *Richtungsethik* in German. It is said that Müller's work was based on Heidegger's.

<sup>10</sup> Ibid.. Ethics of essence [*benzhi lunli*] is *Wesenethik* in German.

<sup>11</sup> See *Grundlegung zur Metaphysik de Sitten* [Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals], chapter 2, the passage "Einteilung aller möglichen Prinzipien der Sittlichkeit aus dem angenommenen Grundbegriffe der Heteronomie [The classification of all principles of morality which can be found on the conception of heteronomy.]." Also see *Critique of Practical Reason*, part 1, book1, chapter 1, "Von der Grundsätzen der reinen Praktischen Vernunft [Principles of Pure Practical Reason]", Lehrsatz [Theorem] IV, Anmerkung [Remark] II.

<sup>12</sup> See *Xiangshan Quanji* [Complete Works of Xiangshan], *juan 15* "Yu Fu Keming Shu [Letter to Fu Keming]".

<sup>13</sup> *Ming Ru Xue'an* [Lives and Works of Ming Confucians], *juan 16* "Jiangyou Wang Men Xue'an [Writings of the Wang School of the Right Bank]": "As regards the philosophy of Yaojiang, only the scholars of the Right Bank are its true successors, most notably Dongguo, Nianan, Liangfeng, and Shuangjiang. Their successors in turn were Tangnan and Simo. All of them were able to track down the meaning that Yangming did not fully articulate."

<sup>14</sup> See *Ming Ru Xue'an*, *juan 12*, "Zhezong Wang Men Xuean [Writings of the Wang School of Central Zhejiang]" 2: "There are today diverse interpretations of the Master [i.e., Wang Yangming]. Since *liangzhi* is the flowing out of *zhijue* [awareness, feeling], it does not drop down on any place, nor can it be formulated [*dianyao*, specified]. Once it touches practice [*gongfu*], it inevitably hampers its substance of emptiness and cannot but approach Chan [Zen]."

<sup>15</sup> See *Ming Ru Xue'an*, *juan 32*, "Taizhou Xue'an [Writings of Taizhou]": "Master Yangming's philosophy was expounded by Taizhou and Longxi and became the rage. It is also because of Taizhou and Longxi that the transmission was lost. Taizhou and Longxi were often dissatisfied with their master's teaching, and would also explain Gautama's mysteries and ascribe them to their master, for they climbed onto Yangming and taught Chan [Zen]."

<sup>16</sup> See *Chuan Xi Lu* [Instructions for Practical Living], *juan 2*.

<sup>17</sup> *Li Ji* [Book of Rites], "Sang Fu Xiao Ji [Garments of Mourning]": "*Biezi wei zu, ji bie wei zong* 別子為祖，繼別為宗 [The son born of the concubine becoming ancestor, his successor becomes the temple-ancestor]." Zheng's annotation says "*Biezi wei zu* means that the feudal lord's son by a concubine is treated as the ancestor to his descendants. The term *biezi* [other son] means that the *gongzi* [heir to the feudal lord] cannot treat him as the temple ancestor. *Ji bie wei zong* means that the oldest son of the wife proper of the

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*biezi* [son born of the feudal lord's concubine] is treated as *zong* [temple ancestor] by his clan, and is what is called the temple ancestor that does not change for one hundred generations."